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THE PENNSYLVANIA WORK RULE: AN ANALYSIS OF
ITS PROPRIETY IN LIGHT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ACT AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Under the Pennsylvania Welfare Code an employable person
who refuses to seek, accept, and retain employment is declared in-
eligible for federal welfare assistance as are his dependents.' How-
ever, there is a major exception to this rule: If the employable per-
son who refuses employment has been the subject of a mandatory
referral to the Federal Work Incentive Program 2 (WIN), only his
assistance will be terminated while the aid to his dependents con-
tinues.' Thus an anomaly exists in Pennsylvania: The continuance
of welfare payments to needy children in essentially identical sit-
uations depends on whether the employable member of their fam-
ily has been the subject of a mandatory referral to a WIN pro-
gram.4  This Comment will analyze the statutory scheme from
which this anamolous situation arises and evaluate the propriety
of the Pennsylvania Work Rule in light of the Social Security Act5
and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
6
I. HOW THE PROBLEM ARISES
Pennsylvania is a participant in the Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children Program' established by the Social Security Act
of 1935.8 The "purpose clause" of the legislation creating the AFDC
program provides:
1. Pennsylvania Welfare Manual § 3182 (1969) [hereinafter referred
to as PA. WEL. MAN. J; The provisions in the PA. WEL. MAN. which deny
aid to needy families, whose employable member of that family refuses to
seek, accept, and retain employment, will hereinafter be referred to as the
Pennsylvania Work Rule.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 633 (1969); Pennsylvania provision for the same rule
is found at PA. WEL. MAN. § 3191.11 (1969).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 602(19)(F) (1969); PA. WEL. MAN. §§ 3192, 3192.1
(1969).
4. See notes 27-39 and accompanying text infra.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-40 (1969).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. 14.
7. See PA. WEL. MAN. §§ 3190-98.2; [Aid to Families with Dependent
Children hereinafter referred to as AFDC].
8. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313 (1968). For a further discussion
of these provisions see U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AssocI-
ATED WITH FEDERAL GRANTS FOR PUBLic AssIsTANcE, 5-7 (1964); and Wede-
meyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1966).
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For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent
children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by
enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and re-
habilitation and other services . . . to needy dependent
children and the parents or relatives with whom they are
living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to
help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability
for maximum self-support and personal independence ...
there is authorized . . . a sum sufficient to carry out the
purpose of this part.9
The program is a joint effort between the federal and state gov-
ernments. It is funded largely by the federal government and ad-
ministered by the states.10 Federal funds are distributed in ac-
cordance with a complicated formula whereby federal and state
revenues are provided on a matching funds basis."' Although state
participation is not mandatory, those states that do participate are
required to submit an AFDC plan for approval by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare. 12 The state plans must conform to
the Social Security Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.1 3 To insure
state compliance with the federal purpose of the program the state
plan must be administered by a single state agency' 4 and must be
"in effect in and mandatory upon" all political subdivisions in the
state. 5
In preparing their state plan for the administration of AFDC
funds the states are free to pass their own additional conditions of
eligibility as long as they are not inconsistent with the Social Se-
curity Act. While many state prerequisites for AFDC funds have
been struck down because they conflict with the Social Security
Act,'I the prerequisite of seeking, accepting and retaining employ-
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1969).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1969).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1969).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1969).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-4 (1969).
14. In Pennsylvania that agency is the Pennsylvania Board of Wel-
fare.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 602(1) (1969): If subsequent to HEW approval the
state fails to comply substantially with any provisions in regard to the
administration of AFDC benefits, the Secretary will notify the state that
further payments will not be made until the state demonstrates to the Sec-
retary that the prohibited practice is no longer in effect. 42 U.S.C. § 604
(a) (1969).
16. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (the Court struck
down the Louisiana "Substitute Father Rule" as a means of denying aid to
a number of needy families). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (the Court struck down Connecticut's one year residency require-
ment); Woods v. Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (the District
ment has consistently been recognized. 17 A long standing Pennsyl-
vania welfare policy has been to encourage those receiving assist-
ance to seek employment and provide for their dependents. In fur-
therance of this policy Pennsylvania, like many other states,1 8 has
enacted a "work rule" which will terminate all assistance payments
to the families of employable recipients who refuse to use their
best efforts to find and retain employment.1" The Pennsylvania
Work Rule provides:
Every employable person is required, as a condition of
eligibility for assistance, to seek, accept, and retain employ-
ment within the level of his capacity. The effect of failure
to retain employment on eligibility for assistance depends
on the following factors: the deliberateness and frequency
of leaving employment, and the persons efforts to seek
other employment. An employed person who has employ-
ment that does not provide for himself, and his spouse and
minor or incompetent children, is required to seek and ac-
cept additional or more remunerative work consistent with
his capacity and the opportunities for such work.
An employable person who fails to meet these require-
ments is ineligible for assistance, as is his spouse and or
minor or incompetent adult children living with him.
The employable person and his dependants remain in-
eligible until the employable person demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the County Assistance Office that he is mak-
ing a sincere effort to get and hold employment.
20
Court held that Pennsylvania could not compel AFDC recipients to initiate
court action for support from their relatives. The court held that such a
requirement would be to prescribe an additional condition of eligibility
inconsistent with the Social Security Act).
17. See, e.g., Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
Dawson v. Whitt, 442 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1969).
18. ALA. CODE tit. 44, § 12 (1959); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-292
(Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-310 (1960); CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS
CODE §§ 11301-3 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-281a (Supp.
1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 902 § 52-152 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 252.27 (Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 39-708(g) (Supp. 1967);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:68 (1951); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4459
(1964); MASS. GE. LAWS ANN. ch. 117, § 114 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 16.455(1) (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.26 (Supp. 1967); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 205.700 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 71-307 (Supp.
1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-110 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 38-428 (1963);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165:31 (Supp. 1967); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
44.1-94, 4-87 (1940); N.Y. Soc. SE~v. LAW §§ 131(4), 164, 350-b(4)
(McKinney 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-01-14, 017, -18 (1960); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5113.04 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 203.125, 411.860 (1965);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-8-3 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 71-157, -158
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-805 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3050
(Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 63-338 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 74.04.420 (Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-9 (1966).
19. PA. WEL. MAN. §§ 3181-82 (1969).
20. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3182 (1969): PA. WEL. MAN. § 3182 (1969) pro-
vides:
The purpose of the employment regulation is twofold; to de-
fine the conditions under which an employable person may be eli-
gible for assistance, and to describe the services through which the
caseworker helps the person achieve an economic self-dependence
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Until 1968 the Pennsylvania Work Rule was applied uniformly to
AFDC recipients throughout the State. However at that time, in
compliance with the 1967 amendments to Title IV of the Social Se-
curity Act,2 1 the State established a work incentive program in ap-
propriate areas throughout Pennsylvania.
22
The 1967 Act provides that the Secretary of Labor shall estab-
lish work incentive programs in each state and in each political
subdivision of a state in which he determines there is a significant
number of eligible individuals. 23 In other parts of the state the
Secretary of Labor must use his best efforts to provide such pro-
grams either by providing for transportation to "WIN counties" or
by establishing a WIN program in that previoulsy non-WIN
county. 24 Three types of job training are provided in a WIN pro-
gram: (1) on the job training for those persons most qualified to
work, (2) training for those individuals who are not presently em-
ployable but whose training is likely to lead to regular employ-
ment, and (3) a program for work projects for individuals for whom
a job in the regular economy cannot be found.2 5 Like all other
provisions of the AFDC program, the daily administration of the
WIN program rests with the states. The entry of an AFDC recipi-
ent into the WIN program is governed by the state agency in charge
of administering AFDC assistance. The state plan must include a
referral procedure whereby appropriate persons are enrolled in the
state WIN program.26 In Pennsylvania the County Assistance Of-
fice refers eligible AFDC recipients to the Bureau of Employment
Security.
21
commensurate with his age, health and abilities.
The regulations are based on the fact that the community
expects a person to work rather than to depend on public aid.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-644 (1969).
22. PA. WEL. MAN. §§ 3190-3198.252; Pennsylvania's State Plan, Serv-
ices to Families and Children (AFDC program which includes WIN) was
approved in its final form on June 4, 1971 by Leslie F. McCoy M.D., Act-
ing Regional Commissioner of HEW.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1969).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1969).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 632(b) (1969).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (1969).
27. PA. WrL. MAN. § 3190.2 (1969) provides:
By law, the U.S. Department of Labor is given responsibility for
administering the work and training components of the WIN
Program. In Pennsylvania, the Bureau of Employment Security
will operate the program through the local offices.
Also by law, State welfare agencies (through the County Assist-
ance Offices in Pennsylvania) are responsible for the prompt re-
ferral to BES of all appropriate AFDC recipients for participation
in the Work Incentive Program, or for BES services if the WIN
program is not in operation in the county. They are responsible
for providing financial aid and services under certain described
conditions to persons enrolled in the WIN program.
The participants in a WIN program can be divided into two
groups: "mandatory referrals," directed into the program by the
County Assistance Office; and "voluntary referrals," who elect to
participate in the program voluntarily. A Pennsylvania AFDC
recipient may be the subject of a mandatory referral if he (1) is a
father or (2) is a youth over the age of sixteen or (3) is a mother
with no children under the age of eighteen in the home.28 However
he may not be referred to the Bureau of Employment Security if he
(1) is mentally or physically incapacitated or (2) is a youth in the
process of completing his education or (3) is needed in his home to
care for another member of the household or (4) is so remote from
a WIN program that he cannot effectively participate or (5) is on
strike.2 9 Even though the individual is not considered appropriate
for a mandatory referral to a WIN program, he may elect to partici-
pate on a voluntary basis. Such individuals will be referred to the
Bureau of Employment Security for participation in the WIN pro-
gram unless the County Assistance Office determines that the re-
ferral would be inimical to the welfare of the individual or his
family." The result is that a person may participate in the WIN
program even if he has been found to be inappropriate under the
provisions that pertain to mandatory referrals.
In addition to providing a system of referral for mandatory or
voluntary job training, the WIN program is a compulsory work
program which provides a system of sanctions that may be applied
to mandatory referrals who refuse to participate. The subject of a
mandatory referral who has refused, without good cause, to partici-
pate in the WIN program or has refused to accept an employment
offer can be denied assistance.31 However, unlike the sanctions of
the Pennsylvania Work Rule, which terminates assistance to the
entire family of an employable person who refuses to find and re-
tain work, the sanctions of the WIN program apply only to the
employable person. In computing the AFDC family grant the re-
cipient who refuses to participate in the WIN program is not
counted in making the determination of need for his family.32 The
remainder of the family continues to receive AFDC (although re-
ceiving a lower dollar amount) 38 in spite of the employable person's
28. PA. WgL. MAN. § 3191.112 (1969)
29. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3191.111 (1969); see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19)
(A) (iv)-(vii) (1969).
30. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3191.113 (1969); see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)
(19) (A) (iii) (1969).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 602(19)(F) (1969); PA. WxL. MAN. § 3192 (1969).
However, the termination is delayed for a period of sixty days if during
that period the individual accepts counseling designed to help and encour-
age him to resume participation in the program. PA. WE. MAN. §§ 3192,
3192.1 (1969).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 602(19)(F) (1969); PA. WEL. MAN. § 3192.1 (1969).
33. In Pennsylvania the family of the uncooperative WIN referral
will continue to receive AFDC in the form of protective payments; see
PA. WEL. MAN. §§ 3770-3777.32, 3192.1 (1969).
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refusal to participate in WIN or use his best efforts to seek, accept
and retain employment. 4
The result of Pennsylvani's attempt to comply with the federal
WIN program while still enforcing the Pennsylvania Work Rule has
resulted in a seemingly inconsistent situation. In areas where the
WIN program is operational, only the individual who has been the
subject of a mandatory referral to the program will be denied as-
sistance if he refuses to participate; the rest of the family will con-
tinue to receive AFDC, although it will be reduced by the amount
provided for the employable person. However, in non-WIN coun-
ties assistance can and will be denied to those needy families in
which there is an employable person who fails to seek, accept and
retain employment. The remainder of this Comment will deal with
the statutory and constitutional propriety of such a situation.
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA WORK RULE AND THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
A. The Pennsylvania Work Rule and the General AFDC Pro-
visions
The initial step in evaluating the propriety of the Pennsylvania
Work Rule, or any state law that affects the distribution of AFDC,
is a determination of whether that particular statute is consistent
with the Social Security Act under which the AFDC and WIN pro-
grams are established.
The statutory purpose of the AFDC program is to provide for
the care of needy and dependent children.35 The statute contem-
plates that this will help maintain and strengthen family life.36
Further, these basic principles underlying the Social Security Act
are well recognized by case law.3 7 It is submitted that to deny
needy families AFDC because of the refusal of an employable mem-
ber of the family to work, is contrary to the purpose clause of the
AFDC program. It does not appear that the termination of AFDC
does anything to encourage child care. Furthermore, it can hardly
be maintained that family life is "strengthened" and "maintained"
by operation of the Pennsylvania Work Rule. 38 Since the needy
34. PA. WE. MAN. § 3192.1 (1969): It should be noted that these
sanctions do not apply to either voluntary WIN referrals or AFDC re-
cipients in counties where there is no WIN program.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1969).
36. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
37. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 328-9 (1968); Wood v.
Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510, 513 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
38. See note 54 infra.
family is denied AFDC only as long as the employable person is a
member of the household,39 if the person who fails to seek, accept
and retain employment leaves the home, the needy family's aid will
be restored.40  It is therefore submitted that the Pennsylvania
Work Rule disrupts family life by rewarding the needy family for
the employable person's desertion. In this sense the Work Rule is
contrary to the express purpose of the AFDC program in maintain-
ing and strengthening family life. However, instead of striking
down state compulsory work rules based on the AFDC purpose
clause, the courts have looked to the wording of subsequent sec-
tions of the Social Security Act to uphold compulsory work rules.
41
In order to comply with the Social Security Act, each state as-
sistance plan must provide that all eligible individuals will receive
AFDC.42 A child is eligible for and entitled to AFDC if he is both
"needy" and "dependent. ' 43 A child is "needy" if he does not
have sufficient income and resources to provide economic security
when measured against standards of need established by each par-
ticipating state.44 A child is "dependent" under the Social Security
Act when he has been deprived of parental support by reason of the
parent's death, incapacity or absence from the home. 45 Further,
under the 1961 amendments to title IV of the Social Security Act
a child may also be dependent if his father is unemployed, pro-
vided that his father has not refused a bona fide offer of employ-
ment or training for employment.4 6 Therefore, according to the
plain language of the Social Security Act, a needy child is not "de-
pendent" for the purposes of AFDC and is therefore not eligible for
aid if his father has refused to seek, accept and retain employ-
ment.4 7 This interpretation has been supported by HEW, the fed-
39. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra.
40. See generally Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 371 (1970) (Doug-
las J. dissenting opinion).
41. See, e.g., Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
Dawson v. Driver, 420 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1967); Stacy v. Ashland County
Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 39 Wis. 2d 595, 159 N.W.2d 630 (1967).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1969) provides:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with
children must...
(10) provide . .. that aid to families with dependent children
shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible in-
dividuals.
43. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
44. HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIc AssIsTANcE, Part TV, § 3120.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1969).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1969).
47. This "need" and "dependency" approach is the one generally
taken by the courts in determining whether the State has added an
"additional condition of eligibility, inconsistent with the terms of the So-
cial Security Act"; see Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970).
In Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1970), it was
held that an AFDC recipient could not be denied assistance because of
the misconduct of his parent. Although this may seem highly correlative to
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eral department charged with administering AFDC. According to
HEW one of the purposes of the AFDC program has always been to
encourage employment among the able.
48
The "purpose clause" of the AFDC program also states that the
federal plan is designed to help "parents and relations to attain or
retain capability for maximum self-support and personal independ-
ence. . . ."49 According to HEW, the 1961 amendments made it
clear that the federal government sought to encourage state com-
pulsory work programs.50 Although the practice of denying as-
sistance to the whole family when one employable member refuses
to work seems violative of the general purpose of the AFDC pro-
gram, it appears consistent with the specific language of other parts
of the Social Security Act setting out the AFDC program. In ad-
dition, state work rules have been upheld by the courts and have
the support of HEW.
B. The Pennsylvania Work Rule and the WIN Program
A second area of conflict between state work rules and the So-
cial Security Act concerns the conflicting sanctions provided by
state work rules and the WIN program. To date only one case has
dealt with this conflict. In Woolfolk v. Brown5' the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia struck down the Vir-
the situation here, Cooper involved a mother's mismanagement of funds.
It is doubtful whether the courts would hold that a child was denied AFDC
because of the misconduct of his parent in not finding employment, since
there is an express provision in the AFDC program for such a situation
wherein the Cooper situation (mismanagement of funds) there was not.
48. Brief for HEW as Amicus Curiae at 2, Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F.
Supp. 112 (E.D. Va. 1971); [hereinafter referred to as HEW Amicus Curie
Brief].
49. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1969).
50. HEW Amicus Curiae Brief, at 5, states:
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 607, enacted in 1961, a State, at its op-
tion, was permitted to obtain Federal financial assistance under
its AFDC program for aid furnished to children who were needy
because of the unemployment of a parent. That section ...
provided that a State AFDC plan which included families with un-
employed parents must provide for cooperative arrangements with
the State public employment offices looking toward employment
of such parents and must further provide that AFDC will be
denied to the family if . . . the unemployed parent refuses with-
out good cause to accept employment in which he is able to engage
which is offered through the public employment offices or is other-
wise offered by an employer .... The plan must further provide
for cooperative arrangements with the State vocational education
agency to encourage training of unemployed parents, and must
provide for denial of AFDC to a family if, and for as long as, the
unemployed parent refused without good cause to undergo any
such training.
51. 325 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1971).
ginia Work Rule, holding that the sanctions applied under the state
rule were inconsistent with the federal WIN program. -5 2  Since the
Virginia rule is essentially identical to the Pennsylvania Work
Rule,5 13 if the Woolfolk decision is an accurate interpretation of the
meaning and intent of the WIN program, the Pennsylvania Work
Rule and similar rules in other states are contrary to the Social
Security Act and therefore void..
4
The operation of the Virginia Work Rule created the same in-
consistent situation that exists in Pennsylvania's welfare program.
AFDC recipients who were not part of the WIN program were de-
nied assistance if an employable person in the family refused to
seek, accept and retain employment. 55 However, in WIN counties,
if an employable family member had been found eligible for the
WIN program and subsequently refused to participate in a WIN
training program or accept a bona fide offer of employment, the
family continued to receive AFDC.56 In Woolfolk the court struck
down this anomaly and held that the work rule sanctions could not
be applied to the families of AFDC recipients who refuse to find
52. Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1971).
53. This controversy arose when four plaintiffs were denied AFDC
when the Local Welfare Board of Bedford County terminated assistance
payments after it determined that plaintiffs failed to accept an employ-
ment opportunity.
Plaintiffs brought this action to attack parts of section 211.4F and E of
the Virginia Manual of Policy and Procedure for Local Welfare Depart-
ments. Quite similar to the Pennsylvania Work Rule the Virginia Rule
states that an applicant for public assistance is expected to make use of and
develop the resources available to him in relation to his capacity to do so.
An employable person is expected to use his best efforts to find employ-
ment. It is further provided that:
Refusal by an otherwise eligible individual sixteen years of age
or over to accept a work opportunity available to him under the
conditions specified above renders him ineligible for assistance.
If such an individual is a husband or parent living in the home, the
wife or children are ineligible also.
§ 211.4F, E Virginia Manual of Policy and Procedure for Local Welfare
Departments.
54. Pennsylvania and Virginia are not the only states that terminate
AFDC to needy families when a member of that family refuses to seek,
accept and retain employment. See Alabama Manual for Administration
of Public Assistance, § 11-44; Arizona Public Assistance and Service Man-
ual, § 3-40; Arkansas Department of Public Welfare Manual, § 2332.7.5;
California Department of Public Welfare Manual, § C170; District of Col-
umbia Handbook for Public Assistance Administration, EL § 4-10; Illinois
Categorical Assistance Manual, Volume I, § 1200.1-1202; Michigan Manual
of Policies and Procedures, § 253; Mississippi Manual of Policies and Pro-
cedures for Administration of Public Assistance, Vol. III p. 4518; Missouri
Public Assistance Manual, § V; New Hampshire Manual of Policies, Pub-
lic Assistance, Part I-D-8, p. 65; New York Official Compilation of Codes,
Rules, and Regulations, Volume 18, Subchapter B, Article 4, § 385.7; North
Carolina Public Assistance Manual of Policies and Procedures, § 445; South
Carolina Manual of Policies and Procedures, p. 39; Texas Manual of Serv-
ices, § 4330.4; Vermont Family Service Manual of Policies and Proced-
ures, § 2492; Washington Staff Manual, § 6.2315.
55. See note 53 supra.





The court, the litigants and HEW all agreed that the Virginia
Work Rule did not apply to mandatory referrals to the WIN pro-
gram.58 The WIN statute specifically states that the sanction to
be applied to mandatory referrals to the program who refuse to
participate is the termination of their aid, while protective pay-
ments to their families are continued.5 9 The application of a more
stringent sanction, such as the state work rule, would clearly vio-
late the intent and plain wording of the statute. Pennsylvania rec-
ognizes this and, in implementing the WIN program, has not applied
the work rule to WIN families. 60 The central issue for decision in
Woolfolk was whether the sanctions established by the WIN pro-
gram, for specific application to mandatory referrals, placed any
limit on the sanctions that the state could impose on individuals
who were not associated with the WIN program.
HEW submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the state.
They took the position that since the federal statute is silent as to
the propriety of a compulsory work rule for AFDC recipients not
participating in a WIN program, a void exists which the states are
free to fill by passing there own work rules.6 1 While HEW did not
support harsh state work rules, they argued that there is nothing in
the Social Security Act which prohibits the states from terminating
AFDC to entire families when an employable member of that fam-
ily refuses to use his best efforts to work.62 HEW pointed out that
Congress did not intend the WIN program to be in effect in all
political subdivisions of every state participating in the AFDC pro-
gram. The Act provides that the program is to be established
where the Secretary of Labor determines that "there is a significant
number of individuals who have attained age 16 and are receiving
aid to families with dependent children." In other political subdi-
visions the Secretary is only required to "use his best efforts to pro-
vide such programs." 3
Given this broad segment of the AFDC program left unaf-
fected by WIN, HEW relied on the often expressed intent of Con-
57. Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (E.D. Va. 1971).
58. Id. at 1167.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 602(F) (1969).
60. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3181 (1969) provides:
[I]f the individual [the mandatory referral] still refuses with-
out good cause to participate or to accept employment, the in-
dividual is removed from the assistance grant and assistance is
paid to the family in the form of protective payments.
61. HEW Amicus Curiae Brief, at 9.
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1969).
gress to curb the welfare rolls by encouraging employment. 4
HEW could find nothing in the 1967 amendments to the Social
Security Act establishing the WIN program, which "would preclude
the State from imposing work requirements as a condition of eligi-
bility for AFDC." 5  Given the states' wide discretion in distribut-
ing AFDC, HEW concluded that the statutory sanctions established
by Congress within the WIN program set only minimum qualifica-
tions and sanctions which the state may impose. 6 HEW admitted
and criticized the discrepancy in the sanctions imposed upon WIN
and non-WIN families, but maintained that the anomaly is not pro-
hibited by the WIN provisions.
67
Unfortunately the amicus curiae brief includes no analysis of
the WIN provisions for voluntary referrals, nor does it mention
who may qualify as a volunteer. It was these provisions governing
voluntary referrals that the court in Woolfolk found irreconciliable
with a state work rule.
In striking down the Virginia Work Rule the court in Woolfolk
placed particular emphasis upon the fact that the WIN provisions
make a specific allowance for people who are not subject to man-
datory referral to a WIN program. These AFDC recipients may
volunteer for participation in WIN, however the statute is silent
as to what, if any, sanctions apply to these voluntary referrals. The
Social Security Act provides that an employable AFDC applicant
may be found appropriate for WIN referral provided that he meets
specified criteria as to age, capability and closeness to a WIN pro-
gram.68 If found appropriate by the local welfare agency he is
referred to the Secretary of Labor for participation in WIN.69 It
is further provided that a person found inappropriate for such re-
ferral may still volunteer for participation in the WIN program.70
The volunteer will be denied admission to WIN only if his partici-
pation would be inimical to his family.71 The court concluded
that on the face of the WIN statutory provision an employable
AFDC recipient could always volunteer for a WIN program and
be determined either appropriate or inappropriate for WIN partici-
pation. 72 The central question facing the court was what sanctions
the state may apply against a voluntary referral who subsequently
64. HEW Amicus Curiae Brief, 9.
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 11, 12.
67. Id. at 12.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (A) (1969).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (1969).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (iii) (1969).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (19) (iii) (1969); PA. WEL. MAN. § 3191.113
(1969) provides that a person who volunteers "may" be referred, while
the Social Security Act provides that a volunteer "will" be referred. It
therefore would appear that the Pennsylvania referral clause allows a dis-
cretionary function by the State, not contemplated by the Social Security
Act.
72. Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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refuses to participate in WIN. The law in Pennsylvania is that the
person's family would be subject to termination of all AFDC under
the Work Rule.78 However, the court in Woolfolk came to the op-
posite conclusion.
District Judge Merhige concluded that the only logical mean-
ing that can be drawn from the Social Security Act is that although
Congress did not apply the WIN sanctions to voluntary referrals, it
intended these referrals to be protected by the WIN provisions. 74
The opinion reasoned that the failure of the Act to provide sanc-
tions for voluntary referrals is such a conspicuous omission that
the only logical conclusion is that Congress was granting this class
of referrals a "substantial right" not to have sanctions harsher
than those imposed upon mandatory WIN referrals.7 - The opinion
stated:
Congress having determined that such persons were not to
be forced to participate in WIN by the federal statutory
sanction, scarcely can be considered to have intended to
permit parallel state sanctions to operate against volun-
teers. Much less can Congress be taken to have permitted
the use of a state work rule to compel inappropriate per-
sons to volunteer for WIN. The operation of the Work
Rule against persons, wherever situated, to be considered
for WIN participation is illegal.78
Under Judge Merhige's analysis, any person eligible to receive
AFDC may volunteer for WIN participation and avoid the drastic
sanctions of a state work rule.7 7 However, to require an AFDC re-
cipient to formally volunteer for WIN participation before he is af-
forded the volunteer's protections would be unnecessary and a
mere formality. 78 Therefore, any person eligible to volunteer for
WIN participation would be legally immune from the sanctions of a
73. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3191.113 (1969) provides:
If an individual referred to BES [Bureau of Employment Se-
curity] on a voluntary basis refuses to participate in a training
program or to accept employment, this has no effect on his or his
family's eligibility for assistance or the method by which it is paid.
In counties with a WIN program in operation, Manual § 3192
[which sets out the WIN sanctions for mandatory referrals] does
not apply to individuals referred to BES on a voluntary basis.
Therefore in Pennsylvania a voluntary referral who subsequently de-
cides not to participate in WIN will not be the subject of the WIN sanc-
tions regardless of where in the State he resides. If the decision in Wool-
folk correctly interprets the federal WIN provisions, certainly this part of
the Pennsylvania Work Rule is illegal.
74. Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1971).




state work rule which terminates AFDC to needy families.7 9
It was apparent to the court in Woolfolk that any employable
person applying for or receiving AFDC may volunteer for partici-
pation in WIN.8 0 Indeed, while the Social Security Act anticipates
that not all counties will have a WIN program," persons can be
referred from non-WIN counties to WIN counties for participation
in the program.8 2 Therefore, an employable AFDC recipient or ap-
plicant may always volunteer85 and be protected by the WIN pro-
visions even if after consideration by the Secretary of Labor it is
determined that the person's participation in WIN would be imprac-
tical.14 According to Woolfolk, voluntary referrals cannot be sub-
ject to the harsh sanctions of a compulsory state work rule which
terminates AFDC to their families where an employable member
of that family refuses to seek, accept and retain employment. Since
all employable AFDC recipients are eligible to volunteer for par-
ticipation in a WIN program, their AFDC may not be terminated
because of the refusal of an employable family member to find
and hold a job.
Perhaps the inconsistencies and problems in the administration
of WIN have arisen simply because Congress intended that all
AFDC recipients would be at least near to a county that was par-
ticipating in a WIN program.8 5 Contrary to this intention a situa-
tion exists in Pennsylvania whereby many needy employable
AFDC recipients are hours from the nearest WIN county. It is
impractical for the state to transport such persons to a participating
WIN county, even though the Social Security Act clearly provides
that the Secretary of Labor shall use his "best efforts" to do so.8 "
Aware of this impracticality, HEW has approved the Pennsylvania
AFDC plan even though in certain areas it seems to conflict with
the federal statutory provisions.8 7 The same problem existed in
Virginia, and in Woolfolk Judge Merhige concluded that regardless
of Congress' assumptions in enacting the WIN program, the sanc-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1969) anticipates that in some areas the Secre-
tary of Labor must set up a WIN program. However, in other areas he
need only use "his best efforts"; also 42 U.S.C. § 609 (a) (19) (A) (v)
contemplates that certain AFDC recipients might be "so remote" from a
WIN program that it would be impractical for them to participate.
82. Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1177 (E.D. Va. 1971).
83. According to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (A) (iii) (1969), a voluntary
referral may only be denied participation in WIN when it would be inimi-
cal to the welfare of that person or his family. It is questionable whether
a person who falls into this exception (of referral being inimical to his
welfare or that of his family) would be affected by the Pennsylvania
Work Rule, since he would probably be either unemployable or his pres-
ence would be needed in the home.
84. Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1175 (E.D. Va. 1971).
85. See Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1175-77 (E.D. Va. 1971).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 632 (1969).
87. See note 22 supra.
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tions of the WIN program are controlling and the states are bound
thereby.8  He stated that changing the obvious intention of Con-
gress and basic premises upon which the law was written is not
within the proper purview of HEW, the states, or the courts. Such
is the responsibility of Congress and until Congress acts the states
are bound by the law.8 9
Implicit in the sanctions of the WIN program is the guarantee
that voluntary referrals to the program, or those who could volun-
teer, will not be subjected to more stringent sanctions than AFDC
recipients who are mandatory referrals. As presently administered
the Pennsylvania Work Rule does impose harsher sanctions against
this group and therefore is in conflict with the provisions of the
1967 amendments to the Social Security Act.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ASPECTS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA WORK RULE
There is another possible attack which can be made on the
discriminatory situation which exists in Pennsylvania whereby
AFDC recipients suffer different sanctions when an employable
member of their family refuses to seek, accept and retain employ-
ment. Under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution a state may not deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.90  All persons subjected to state
88. Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1177 (1971).
89. Id.
Some other legislative scheme might better have further re-
duced the ranks of government dependants, or been more economi-
cal, or actually benefited more recipients. But it is not for this
Court or for Virginia to rewrite the federal legislation. We must
deal with furnished legislative products and apply them to the
facts. If the outcome is not what Congress still desires, Con-
gress may withdraw its mandate. The Court merely notes that to
the extent that the achievements anticipated in the committee re-
ports have not been forthcoming and the passage of AFDC bene-
ficiaries to self-supporting status has been frustrated by the un-
availability of sanctions such as Virginia has attempted to apply,
such result is at least partially attributable to the limited develop-
ment of the WIN programs to date.
Id. at 1177.
90. U.S. CoNsT. amend. 14; The issue is not whether needy persons
have a right to welfare. If needy persons did have a constitutional right
to welfare assistance the issue would be whether those denied AFDC
under the Pennsylvania Work Rule are being denied a constitutional right
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has
gone so far as to hold that a state's termination of welfare benefits must
conform to constitutional procedural due process. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970). However, the Court has stopped short of declaring
that there is a constitutional right to federal welfare assistance; For a
full treatment of the right to welfare see Graham, The Right to Receive;
The Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y. L. REv. 451 (1968); see also, Dandridge v.
legislation must be treated essentially alike, under comparable cir-
cumstances and conditions, both in privileges conferred and liabil-
ities imposedY1 This requirement demands equal treatment to-
ward classes in the same place and under like circumstances. 2
However not every unequal application of a state law is a denial of
equal protection. 3 In Pennsylvania's AFDC program needy chil-
dren may be denied AFDC while others, similarly situated, will be
guaranteed the continuance of AFDC in the form of protective pay-
ments.9 4 It remains to be seen whether this present application of
Pennsylvania's welfare law is a denial of equal protection. Tradi-
tionally the states have been granted wide latitude in the adminis-
tration of the AFDC program.99
Two tests have evolved for determining whether a challenged
state practice is a denial of equal protection to those adversely af-
fected.9 6 The most commonly used is the "rational basis test."
When this test is applied the Court will overturn a state's classi-
ficatory scheme only when that scheme is so "palpably arbitrary
that the Court cannot conceive of any constitutionally permissible
objective to which it might be rationally related. '97 This test has
been confined primarily to cases challenging the constitutionality
of business and industrial regulations.9 Generally, if the issue is
equal protection and the rational basis test is applied, the state's
burden of justification for its discriminatory practice is relatively
slight. The courts do not review the reasonableness or wisdom of
the state's discriminatory classification scheme; the scheme is
deemed sufficient if there is a rationally supportable reason for the
regulation. 9
The second test used to determine whether a state practice is a
denial of equal protection is the "compelling interest test." Under
this test the state must show a compelling interest and need for the
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). City of St. Petersburg v. Alsop, 238 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 922 (1957); Orleans Parrish School
Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1958).
91. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1940).
92. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1944-45 (1971).
93. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
94. See notes 7-29 and accompanying text supra.
95. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968); The Social Security Act also makes provision for wide
state discretion in the administration of the respective state AFDC pro-
grams. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 606(a) (3), (b) (1969).
96. For a broad treatment of the concept of equal protection see,
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 660-61 (Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent-
ing opinion); Recent Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
97. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 199,
216 (1914).
98. Note, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1390, 1393 (1970); see, e.g., Morey v.
Doud, 34 U.S. 457 (1951); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911).
99. See note 98 supra.
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statute or state practice that is being challenged. °0  In applying
the compelling interest test, the court inquiry is whether the state
interests advanced by the classification are sufficient to outweigh
the injury done to the individual (or class of individuals) by the
unequal treatment to which he is subjected.' 0 ' The courts tend to
review the classification carefully and demand a convincing demon-
stration that the discrimination bears "a definite and close relation-
ship" to the statutory objective.10 2 The compelling interest test is
used to test equal protection where the rights affected are con-
sidered fundamental and constitutionally based.10
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Shapiro v. Thompson
0 4
and Dandridge v. Williams,'"° are pertinent to an equal protec-
tion evaluation of the Pennsylvania Work Rule. In both of these
cases the issue was whether a state statute which limited the right
to receive AFDC funds constituted a denial of equal protection.
The Court in Shapiro found that there was a denial of equal pro-
tection, while in Dandridge the Court held that there was not.
In Shapiro v. Thompson the Court struck down Connecticut,
Pennsylvania and District of Columbia statutes, holding that the
denial of AFDC to residents of less than a year created an invidious
discrimination denying those residents equal protection of the
laws.'0 6 Speaking for the majority of the court, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan stated:
There is no dispute that the effect of the waiting-period re-
quirement in each case is to create two classes of needy
resident families indistinguishable from each other except
that one is composed of residents who have resided a year
or more, and the second of residents who have resided less
than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole
difference the first class is granted and the second is de-
100. Mr. Justice Harlan describes this test in his dissenting opinion in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
101. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); For a
discussion of the balancing of these interests see Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457, 465 (1965); Note, 84 HARv. L. REV. 612 (1970).
102. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944); Develop-
ments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1122 (1969); Note however that a possibility
of some rationality may be enough for courts to uphold the classification;
e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 631 (1969).
103. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (rights of illegiti-
mates); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry and right
against discrimination based on race); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966) (right to travel); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (right to
vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
104. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Shapiro].
105. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Dandridge].
106. Shapiro %. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969).
nied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the
families to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter,
and other necessities of life.'0°
The majority applied the compelling interest test, emphasizing not
that welfare assistance involved a fundamental interest, but that
the state residency requirement was an infringement on the right
to travel. 08  The court stated that "the purpose of inhibiting mi-
gration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally imper-
missible."'1 9  "[0]ur constitutional concepts of personal liberty
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this move-
ment."11 0
In Dandridge v. Williams AFDC recipients attacked a Mary-
land law which limited AFDC to two hundred and fifty dollars per
month regardless of the size of the family and its actual need."'
The welfare recipients contended that this maximum grant limi-
tation violated the equal protection clause by discriminating against
them solely on the basis of family size.112 Although a three-judge
district court had found the Maryland regulation unconstitutional
as an arbitrary classification denying equal treatment to those of
equal need, 113 the Supreme Court reversed.114 Mr. Justice Stewart,
who delivered the majority opinion, emphasized the traditional
latitude afforded the states in administering AFDC programs., 5
While he recognized the importance of AFDC to the recipient, Mr.
Justice Stewart did not think that this was an appropriate case to
invoke the compelling interest test:" 5
107. Id. at 627.
108. Id. at 630.
109. Id. at 629.
110. Id.
111. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
112. Id. at 474.
113. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968); Applying
the FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59, the court granted defendants motion and
wrote a supplemental opinion dealing exclusively with the equal protec-
tion issue. Id. at 459.
114. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969). Prior to Dandridge
the United States Supreme Court affirmed a district court decision sug-
gesting that a state AFDC regulation should be tested according to the
rational basis standard. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 323 (1969): The issue in Snell was
whether New York could place liens on the property of welfare recipi-
ents. Welfare payments were not at stake there. In this context the ra-
tional basis test was applied.
However, also prior to Dandridge the Court emphasized the importance
of a needy person's access to public assistance. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg the Court held that a welfare recipient
could not have his AFDC terminated prior to a formal hearing which con-
forms to the requirements of due process. Id. at 263.
115. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1969); see King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).
116. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1969).
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For here we deal with state regulation in the social and
economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment only because the regulation results in some
disparity in grants of welfare payments to the largest of
AFDC families.
11 '
The majority in Dandridge recognized "[t]he administration of
public welfare assistance .. .involves the most basic needs of im-
poverished human beings," ' and that there was more at stake
than in the usual economic and business disputes for which the
rational basis test is generally invoked. Still, the Court would not
apply the compelling interest test.119 Applying the rational basis
test the Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Maryland
AFDC maximum-grant law.
In Shapiro the states sought to justify their residency require-
ments by demonstrating the state interests that the regulaions
were designed to further: (1) the protection of the State's fiscal in-
tegrity,1 20 (2) the encouragement of entry of new residents into the
labor force,121 and (3) the prevention of welfare fraud.122 Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan, however, made it very clear that while such criteria
might be sufficient to show a rational basis for a state discrimina-
tion, they were not sufficient to show a compelling state interest.
23
The court therefore struck down the statutes.
24
As was shown in Woolfolk v. Brown125 the sanctions under a
state work rule like Pennsylvania's, which terminate aid to needy
families, are generally enacted for two reasons: (1) to encourage
117. Id.
118. Id. at 485.
119. Id.
120. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
121. Id. at 639. This is always a state interest in promulgating a
compulsory work rule; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1971).
122. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). In regard to the
economic justification Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
We recognize that the State has a valid interest in preserving
the fiscal integrity of its programs .... But a state may not ac-
complish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes
of its citizens .... The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an
otherwise invidious classification.
Id. at 637; The Court also stated that the interest of encouraging welfare
recipients to enter the labor market is a sufficient interest to justify a
discrimination under the rational basis approach. However, where the
State must show a compelling interest to justify its discrimination, the
justification of encouraging AFDC recipients to enter the labor market is
wholly inadequate; Id. at 637.
123. Id. at 634.
124. See notes 106-110 and accompanying text supra.
125. 325 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (E.D. Va. 1971).
employable persons to use their best efforts to find and retain em-
ployment, and (2) to protect the fiscal integrity of the State.12
Shapiro makes it quite clear that proof of such interests will not
suffice to show a compelling state interest for its discriminatory
practice. 12 However in Dandridge v. Williams, Maryland ad-
vanced essentially the same reasons for its maximum AFDC grant
regulation and the regulations were upheld by the Supreme Court.
The difference is that in Dandridge the Court applied the "rational
basis test," and exercised the characteristic judicial restraint gen-
erally associated with that test. The Court stated:
[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems presented by the public welfare assistance pro-
grams are not the business of this Court. . . The Con-
stitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocat-
ing limited funds among the myriad of potential recipi-
ents.
12 8
The state interest advanced in promulgating sanctions which
terminate aid to needy families pursuant to a state work rule are
(1) to encourage welfare applicants to seek employment and (2) to
preserve the fiscal integrity of the State. It was precisely these
reasons that Maryland successfully argued in Dandridge in demon-
strating a rational basis for its discriminatory practice. It is there-
fore submitted that if the rational basis test were applied to the
Pennsylvania Work Rule, a rational basis could be found and the
rule would be upheld. Under that test the Pennsylvania Work
Rule would not be a denial of equal protection to those persons
whose AFDC was completely terminated. The courts would be re-
luctant to delve any deeper into the manner in which Pennsylvania
balances the equities in distributing AFDC. However, if the com-
pelling state interest test applied in Shapiro were applied to the
Pennsylvania Work Rule, it is submitted that the rule would be
adjudged a denial of equal protection to those adversely affected.
Thus the key to any equal protection analysis of the Pennsylvania
Work Rule lies in the choice of the constitutional test which is to
be applied to it. This choice is not made easier by the holdings of
Dandridge and Shapiro.
The Court in Shapiro emphasized two factors in concluding
that the appropriate equal protection test was the compelling in-
terest test:129  (1) there was a fundamental interest involved;
1 30
and (2) the state law had the affect of entirely denying AFDC to
126. Id.
127. See notes 106-110 and accompanying text supra.
128. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
129. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
130. The fundamental interest infringed upon was the right to travel.
The Court stated that the one year residency requirement placed an uncon-
stitutional restraint on the immigration of indigents. Id. at 631.
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needy families." 1 Conversely, Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for
the majority of the Court in Dandridge, laid great stress upon the
fact that (1) there was no fundamental right involved"' and (2)
the State regulation sought only to reapportion, not deny, AFDC to
needy families.
1 33
In Pennsylvania the discriminatory situation arising from the
Work Rule is akin to both Shapiro and Dandridge. As in Dand-
ridge, the Pennsylvania Work Rule infringes on no constitution-
ally based, fundamental right, such as the right to travel. 34 This
indicates that the rational basis test should be applied. However,
the application of the Pennsylvania Work Rule, like the law in
Shapiro, completely terminates AFDC to the needy families af-
fected. This factual affinity with Shapiro lends support to the
adoption of the compelling interest test in evaluating whether the
Pennsylvania Work Rule is a denial of equal protection.
The precedents of Shapiro and Dandridge give no direct indi-
cation of whether the Pennsylvania Work Rule creates a denial of
equal protection. However, Professor Archibald Cox135 of the Har-
131. The Court laid great stress upon the fact that appellees under the
Connecticut law were denied AFDC entirely. The first thing that the
Court aludes to is the great hardship caused by denying Mrs. Thompson
and her children AFDC. Id. at 623. The Court states that welfare aid is
"the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of life."
Id. at 627.
132. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The Court stated
"we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not
affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." Id. at 485.
133. The Court emphasized that the effect of the Maryland statute
was really to give the maximum number of needy persons access to
AFDC. Id. at 480.
Given Maryland's finite resources, its choice is either to support
some families adequately and others less adequately, or not to
give sufficient support to any family. We see nothing in the fed-
eral statute that forbids a State to balance stress which impose on
all families against the greater ability of large families-because
of their inherent economies of scale-to accommodate their needs
to diminish per capita payments . . . policy. . . does not prevent a
State from sustaining as many families as it can ...
Id. This is a very different situation from the one in Shapiro and in
Pennsylvania where the effect of the state law in question is to terminate
AFDC altogether.
134. The appellees in Dandridge suggested that the Maryland statute
(1) infringed on the right to procreate as guaranteed in Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and (2) involved racial discrimination, some-
thing inherently suspect. However the Court rejected both contentions.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 387 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
It is submitted that similarly the courts would view the discriminatory
situation involved with the Pennsylvania Work Rule as violative of no
constitutionally based fundamental rights.
135. Archibald Cox is the Williston Professor of Law, Harvard Law
yard Law School has suggested an approach that might be used by
the courts in evaluating this problem.13 0 It is Professor Cox's ob-
servation that recent Supreme Court equal protection decisions
"cappear to rest upon two largely subjective judgments": (1) "the
relative invidiousness of the particular differentiation," and (2) "the
relative importance of the subject with respect to which equality is
sought.' 3T The first factor relates to whether there is a fundamen-
tal right involved. The more such a right is infringed upon the
stricter the courts will tend to review the discrimination. 138 The
second factor relates to the interest which is at stake. 13 9 In this re-
gard, the more that is at stake the stricter the judicial review of
the discrimination.
Applying this analysis to the Pennsylvania Work Rule it is sub-
mitted that in regard to factor (1) the Pennsylvania Work Rule,
like the Maryland maximum grant statute in Dandridge, would be
subject to only restrained judicial review. The fundamental con-
stitutionally based right to travel that was so important to the de-
cision in Shapiro is not a factor in the Pennsylvania Work Rule.
14f
However, in regard to factor (2)141 Professor Cox's analysis would
suggest a relatively active judicial review and a more rigorous bur-
den on the State to show the interests furthered by the discrimina-
tory practice.
Adopting Professor Cox's analysis, it is therefore submitted
that because the Pennsylvania Work Rule infringes on no funda-
mental right, the courts would be reluctant to adopt the compelling
interest test. However, the serious consequences of the Pennsyl-
vania Work Rule terminating all AFDC to needy families, is so se-
vere (as opposed to mere proportional alterations of AFDC as was
the case in Dandridge) that a stricter judicial review of this discrim-
ination than the standard of review in Dandridge is required. This
analysis suggests that Pennsylvania would, if the State Work Rule
is ever challenged on constitutional grounds, have to go further in
its justification than Maryland did in Dandridge. In essence
Pennsylvania would have to show more of a rational basis for its
discrimination than merely (1) an interest in encouraging em-
ployment among the poor and (2) an interest in preserving the fis-
cal integrity of the state. It is submitted that such factors would
School. Solicitor General of the United States, 1961-65. B.A., Harvard,
1934, LL.B, 1937.
136. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Forward: Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 95
(1966).
137. Id. at 95.
138. Recent Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065 (1969).
139. Id.
140. See notes 108-110 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 129-133 and accompanying text supra. Recent Devel-
opments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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not be enough to show a rational basis when one is threatened with
the loss of all AFDC. If in fact Pennsylvania could not show a
more rational basis for its discrimination than was shown in Dand-
ridge, it is submitted that the Work Rule should be found uncon-
stitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws.
IV. SUiiMVARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Pennsylvania Work Rule allows the State to terminate aid
to certain needy families when an employable member of that fam-
ily refuses to seek, accept and retain employment. As presently
administered the Work Rule encompasses all AFDC applicants
and recipients except those families whose employable family mem-
ber has been the subject of a mandatory referral to a WIN program.
The concurrent application of the Pennsylvania Work Rule and the
more lenient compulsory work rule of the WIN program has cre-
ated a situation whereby needy families with an employable mem-
ber who refuses to work may or may not receive AFDC depending
on the employable family member's eligibility for WIN participa-
tion. Unfortunately the referrability of employable family mem-
bers (the basis for distinguishing bettwen these needy families)
has no relationship to the relative needs of AFDC applicants and
recipients. Nevertheless this factor remains the basis for denying
AFDC to many needy families while granting AFDC to others.
Under the general AFDC provisions such a state practice is le-
gal. However, it is submitted that the denial of AFDC to needy
families as long as there is an employable in the home seems to
weaken family life by encouraging the employable person to de-
sert rather than find employment. In this sense the State Work
Rule seems inconsistent with the general purpose clause of the
AFDC program. However, the courts have consistently upheld
state compulsory work rules under the general AFDC provisions of
the Social Security Act. Under the federal WIN provisions, how-
ever, the law is not so clear. These provisions are silent as to sanc-
tions applicable to voluntary referrals. It is submitted that this si-
lence was indicative of Congress' intent to protect this class of re-
ferral from sanctions any harsher than those applied to mandatory
referrals. Since all AFDC employable recipients are eligible to
volunteer for WIN, all AFDC families should be protected by the
WIN provisions. The Pennsylvania Work Rule provides harsher
sanctions than the WIN provisions, and in that sense is inconsistent
with the WIN provisions of the Social Security Act and is therefore
illegal.
In determining whether the discriminatory practice which de-
nies AFDC to similarly situated needy families is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws, the courts first must determine the
appropriate equal protection test. Shapiro v. Thompson indicated
that the appropriate test is the compelling interest test although
unlike Shapiro the Pennsylvania practice does not involve an in-
fringement on a fundamental right. Dandridge v. Williams indi-
cated that the proper test is the rational basis test although unlike
Dandridge the Pennsylvania Work Rule terminates all AFDC to
the needy families affected. It is submitted that the appropriate
test falls somewhere between the Dandridge and Shapiro equal
protection tests. The result is that unless Pennsylvania could show
more of a rational basis for its discriminatory practice than was
shown in Dandridge, the Pennsylvania Work Rule is an unconstitu-
tional denial of equal protection to those AFDC recipients whose
assistance is terminated under that rule.
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